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When a partnership comes to an end partners have to determine the terms
of the dissolution. A well known way to do so is by enforcing a buy/sell
option. Under its rules one partner has to oﬀer a price for the partnership
and the other agent can choose whether she wants to sell her share or buy
her partner’s share at this price. It is well known that in a model with
private valuations this dissolution rule may generate ineﬃcient allocations.
However, we here show that if partners negotiate for the advantage of being
chooser, then this buy/ sell provision results in an ex-post eﬃcient outcome.
This result helps to explain why such provisions are so widely introduced in
partnership contracts.
JEL Classiﬁcation code: D44, C721 Introduction
The business attorney Mary Hanson writes: "Where two individuals or enti-
ties each own 50% of a corporation, a "forced buy/sell" provision can be very
useful. Such a provision allows one shareholder to give the other a buyout of-
fer. The recipient of the oﬀer must either accept the oﬀer and be bought out,
or turn the oﬀer around and purchase the interest of the ﬁrst shareholder at
the same price and upon the same terms as the ﬁrst shareholder’s oﬀer. This
arrangement assures that the price and terms are fair, since the shareholder
making the oﬀer may end up receiving the purchase price rather than paying
it."1
Partners in commercial relationships have to think about the possibility
that the partnership might end. Disagreement about the future strategy of
the commonly owned ﬁrm, or family circumstances of one of the partners,
might lead to the inevitability of splitting-up. Since it is often impossible or
implausible to sell the partnership (or a share) to a third party, the partners
have to discuss the terms of dissolution among each other. This might cause
ressources-consuming negotiations which might even end up before court, if
no method of valuing the interests of the involved parties has been ﬁxed prior
to the initiation of the dissolution. Therefore it is advisable to include an
arrangement in the initial partnership agreement which predesignates a di-
vision mechanism. One of the common provisions in partnership agreements
for dealing with dissolution is a buy/sell clause2, where one party names a
per share price, and the other owner has the right to buy or sell at that
price. These provisions seem to be highly recommended by legal advisors.
Real life examples of partnerships that have included buy/sell clauses in their
partnership agreement abound3.
1See "Shareholder Agreements: What you and your fellow sharehold-
ers should have in writing"by Mary Hanson, at The Businness Advisor, see
http://www.bizadvisor.com/archive.htm.
2There exists a huge variety of diﬀerent names for the described procedure in the non-
economic literature. Other names given to a buy/sell clause are "Put-Call Provision",
Texas shootout", "Shotgun Clause" and "Russian Roulette".
3Some examples are:
1.- In February 1995, Liberty and Comcast entered into a home shopping partnership that
contained a forced buy-sell clause. Liberty triggered the clause this year, and Comcast
agreed to sell its 57% stake in QVC for $7.9 bil.
2.- The joint venture contract between Primadonna Resorts Inc. and MGM Grand Inc.
included a buy-sell clause which allowed one party to bid for the other’s 50 percent interest
in the $460 million New York- New York Hotel.
3.- In 1993, Levi Strauss & Co. entered into a joint venture partnership with a small
company, Designs Inc., to own and operate high-concept “Original Levi’s Stores” (OLS).
Termination provisions of the partnership were carefully tailored, including a put-call
1One of the best documented partnership arrangement is the one between
Telewest Communications and Comcast UK (or NTL following the amalga-
mation of Comcast and NTL, which was common knowledge at the time
of the agreement), respectively the second and third largest cable franchise
owners in the UK. In August 1998 they devised a clause to determine owner-
ship of their joint venture. Under their arrangement, Comcast/NTL had to
make its best bid to Telewest which would then have the choice of selling its
50% stake to Comcast/ NTL or buying the Comcast/NTL 50% shareholding
at the same price. In August 1999 NTL proposed a price of approx. £428
million to Telewest Communications, who decided to buy at this price. In
its press release from 17 August 1998 Telewest describes the clause:"Telewest
and Comcast have agreed within a certain timeframe to rationalize their in-
terests in Cable London. Consequently, by no later than 30 September 1999,
Comcast (or NTL) will notify Telewest of a price at which Telewest, at its
option, will be required either to purchase Comcast’s 50% interest in Cable
L o n d o no rs e l li t s5 0 %i n t e r e s ti nC a b l eL o n d o nt oC o m c a s t( o rN T L ) "
Buy/sell clauses are a variant of the divide-and-choose method for divid-
ing a cake, which plays an important role in the literature on fair division.
This method for allocating a good among parties is generally deﬁned as a
mechanism where one party proposes a division of the good and the other
party chooses the portion of the division she prefers. If the good is indivisible,
the division can be accomplished with money so that one party proposes a
price, and the other party chooses to, either accept the price, or, to take the
good and pay the ﬁrst party that price. Under complete information, this
mechanism ensures an eﬃcient dissolution and favors the proposer, since she
is aware of all possible gains from trade and can completely exploit these.
If, however, parties only know their own valuation and just have an estimate
about the partner’s valuation, it may result in ineﬃcient allocations (see
McAfee [1992]). Nevertheless, the mechanism can render eﬃcient allocations
if the proposer is the "right" partner, i.e. the partner who perceives herself
as equally likely to be seller and buyer. This fact, together with the broad
use of buy/sell clause brings about that there may be more to the story than
what the mechanism design literature has analyzed so far. In fact, it stems
from the agreement between Telewest and Comcast that the buy/sell clause
is often used after a negotiation stage on the identity of the proposer. The
provision that allowed either of the partners to buy the partnership from the other partner
at any point, subject to certain conditions.
4.- In December 1999 the media company News-Corporation sold its 49.9 % share in
the German TV-channel VOX to CLT-UFA, which already owned 24.9% of VOX for $340
million. Before entering the partnership, both parties agreed upon a put-call provision for
their shares.
2particulars in this real life case has moved us to study the entire dissolution
process which starts with negotiations in which partners decide on who has
the right to choose.
In this paper we consider the buy/sell mechanism with a negotiation stage
to decide the identity of the chooser in the classical framework with inde-
pendent private values (as introduced by Cramton et al [1987] and McAfee
[1992]). We model the negotiations as an ascending auction or equivalently
a sealed bid second price auction where the winner pays the loser. It can be
thought of as a simpliﬁed model of a negotiation procedure in which partners
make alternating oﬀers for the right-to-choose. If one of the partners is not
willing to increase her oﬀer further, she becomes proposer and receives the
last oﬀer made as a monetary payment, i.e. her own bid in the second-price
auction. Note that the information revealed in this procedure may allow the
proposer to reﬁne her beliefs about the chooser’s valuation. We show that
this happens in a way that leads to an eﬃcient dissolution of the partnership.
Even though buy/sell clauses are widely used in practice, it is hardly
analyzed in environments with asymmetric information4. The analysis of
the buy/sell clause (without negotiations) in an independent private values
model (like ours) is performed in McAfee [1992]. His main result shows
that the clause may result in an ineﬃcient outcome and that the proposer is
disadvantaged compared to the chooser. McAfee concludes that "This result
casts a shadow on the entire literature on cake-cutting type mechanisms".
Given this negative result most of the literature on partnership dissolution
studies a more symmetric dissolution mechanism instead: a simultaneous
auction. In this auction both partners submit a sealed bid and the partner
with the higher bid receives the partnership whereas the per-share price is
given by a (pre-determined) convex combination of the two bids. Such an
auction is shown to be eﬃcient in Cramton et al. [1987] and McAfee [1992]5.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide an economic rationale
for the broad use of buy/sell clauses.
4The analysis of the buy/sell clause in the literature is essentially restricted to complete
information settings where it exhibits nice properties like eﬃciency and envy-freeness. For
an overview of this literature and possible extensions see Brams and Taylor [1996].
5De Frutos [2000] analyzes properties of this auction in a model where partners have
asymmetric prior beliefs. Kittsteiner [2003] shows the possibility of ineﬃciencies even in a
model with symmetric priors but interdependent valuations. An overview of the literature
on partnership dissolution with interdependent valuations is given in Moldovanu [2002].
32 Buy/Sell Clauses in Shareholder Agreements
We consider two risk neutral partners, 1 and 2, with valuations v1 and v2
respectively, for a commonly owned object (partnership). The valuation
vi is private information to partner i. Valuations are independently and
identically distributed according to a commonly known distribution function
F with continuous density f and compact support on [0,1]. In what follows,

















Each partner owns an equal share of the partnership which is due for
dissolution.6 An agent’s utility is linear in payments and share, i.e. the
utility of partner i w h oh o l d sas h a r eo fα in the partnership and receives a
payment m is given by Ui = αvi+m. Hence agent i s utility is initially given
by 1
2vi , which can also be interpreted as her outside-option.
The buy/sell clause in this environment is from an economic viewpoint a
mechanism where one party speciﬁes a price (we call this party the proposer),
and the other party decides whether to buy the object at that price or sell
the object at the price speciﬁed (this party is called the chooser). If p is
the price speciﬁed by the proposer, and each party owns half of the good,
then the chooser selects either p/2 or the object in which case she pays the
proposer p/2. It can easily be veriﬁed that the chooser decides to take the
money as long as the price p is larger than her valuation whereas she decides
to buy her partner’s share otherwise7.
6Hauswald and Hege (2003) analyze four samples of joint ventures announced between
January 1st, 1985 and 2000. The date shows that about 80% of all recorded transactions
are two-partner joint ventures. Further, data indicate that about two thirds of two-partner
joint ventures have 50-50 equity allocations. Similarly, from a sample of 668 worldwide
alliances, Veugelers and Kesteloot (1996) also report that 50% of the joint ventures between
two partners exhibit 50-50 share allocations.
7In the Guide to US Real State Investing issued by the Association of Foreign In-
vestors in Real Estate (AFIRE), one can read: "..it is common for joint venture agree-
ments to provide a “buy-sell” or “put-call” mechanism by which the venture can be ter-
minated. Such a clause is usually thought of as the ultimate mechanism for resolving
disputes...Procedurally, the clause typically provides for one party to oﬀer to buy out the
other...The other party then has the right to sell its interest to the oﬀering party at a price
equal to the oﬀered total value.., or to buy the oﬀering party’s interest at a price equal to
the oﬀered total value. Alternatively (and less commonly), a buyout clause may be based
on a price set by appraisal or arbitration".
4The proposer’s expected utility (or proﬁt) if she proposes p is:
U
P(vP,p)=( vP − p/2)Pr(vC ≤ p)+p/2Pr(vC >p )
=( vP − p)F(p)+p/2,
where P stands for proposer and C for chooser. Let us deﬁne the revenue
maximizing price for the proposer p∗(·) by p∗(vP)=a r gm a x pUP(vP,p) and
t h ed e r i v a t i v eo fUP with respect to its second argument by UP
2 . It is im-
portant to note that the proposer’s optimal strategy does depend on the
distribution of the chooser’s valuation, whereas the chooser’s optimal strat-
egy does only depend on the proposed price p and her own valuation vC (it is
therefore independent of any distributional assumptions). The next proposi-
tion characterizes the equilibrium price set by the proposer and some of its
properties.
Proposition 1 (McAfee [1992]) Denote the median of the distribution F




. The optimal price p∗(v) is the unique solution for p
to UP
2 (v,p)=0 . It is non-decreasing and satisﬁes p∗(v)=v if v = vmed,
p∗(v) <vif v>v med, and p∗(v) >vif v<v med, where vmed stands for the
median valuation.
The rationale behind the properties of the equilibrium price is clear. If
a partner with a valuation above the median sets a price equal to her own
valuation, she will more likely end up buying the asset. She would hence
improve her proﬁts by reducing the buying price8. Similarly, if her valuation
is below the median she is better oﬀ setting a price above her valuation, as
she is more likely the selling partner.
A dissolution mechanism ensures an ex-post eﬃcient allocation if the
partner with the highest valuation gets the entire partnership.9 Using a
buy/sell clause to dissolve a partnership may lead to ineﬃcient allocations.
The ineﬃciency might arise when both partners’ valuations are either below
the median valuation, or both above the median valuation. However, in ei-
ther case, ineﬃciencies only arise when the "wrong" partner is proposing. To
make this point clear, consider ﬁrst that both partners’ valuations are below
the median. As either partner will name a price larger than her valuation,
8By lowering the price she would also sell with a loss to partners with valuation slightly
below her own. As the price is close to her valuation this loss is of second order (whereas
the gain because of the lower buying price is of ﬁrst order).
9In the sample analyzed by Hauswald and Hege (2003), out of 193 US Joint Ventures
with a 50-50 division of shares, they found that, in a time interval of ﬁfteen years, there
was no change in ownership status in 90 whereas there was a buyout, an acquisition by
o n ep a r t n e ro ft h ee n t i r es t a k e ,i n5 1 .
5eﬃciency demands that the partner with the larger valuation proposes. Sim-
ilarly, if both valuations are above the median then an eﬃcient allocation
emerges whenever the partner with the smallest valuation proposes. This
suggest that the partner with the lower valuation should choose if both val-
uations are below the median, and propose if they are above the median. A
natural question to ask is then whether an endogenous determination of the
proposer can overcome the problem of the "wrong" partner becoming the
proposer. There are several reasons why one might be concerned with study-
ing this issue. The main motivating factor for us derives from the fact that
most lawyers recommend including buy/sell clauses in joint venture agree-
ments. It is precisely this fact which moves us to further analyze if this
division scheme can render eﬃcient allocations.
3 Endogenous determination of the proposer
If the agreement signed by the parties does not state which party will propose
it makes sense to consider that the identity of the proposer will be determined
by negotiations among the parties. We examine now the outcome of a disso-
lution when partners must abide by the buy/sell clauses in their agreement,
and they negotiate to determine the proposer10.
We consider a dissolution procedure which consists of two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage, the negotiation stage, partners determine who becomes chooser
and proposer. In the second stage, the pricing stage, they dissolve the part-
nership according to the rules of the buy/sell clause as described in the pre-
vious section. We will refer to this sequential game as the dissolution game.
The negotiation stage, is modelled as a sealed-bid second price auction. Both
partners submit a sealed bid to an auctioneer who announces the lowest bid
and the identity of the partner who submitted it (we call this partner the
loser and the other partner the winner of the auction). The loser proposes
the price in the pricing stage and gets a monetary compensation equal to
her own bid. The winner pays to her partner the lower bid and chooses in
the pricing stage. Note that in the framework of this paper this sealed-bid
second-price auction is strategically equivalent to an ascending-price auction
(which does not require an auctioneer to announce either the winner or the
payment).11 As explained in the introduction, the sealed-bid second-price
10It might be that these negotiations already take place some time before the dissolution
and therefore the identity of the proposer is already speciﬁed in the contract (as in the
Telewest/ Comcast example in the introduction). This is also consistent with the procedure
we model in this section (in the Telewest/Comcast case both ﬁrms were already quite
conﬁdent that they will split up some month after they negotiated the chooser).
11In the ascending auction the price rises continuously and either partner can stop the
6(or the ascending) auction can be interpreted as a negotiation game.
Since the mechanism is sequential, we will ﬁrst study the pricing stage,
i.e., the continuation game that follows the negotiation stage in which the
identity of the proposer has been determined.
3.1 The Pricing Stage
An important aspect of this dissolution game is that information about part-
ners’ valuations is revealed by the strategies played in the ﬁrst round. Part-
ners can hence update their beliefs about the distribution of the other part-
ner’s valuation. This is only crucial insofar as it aﬀects the proposer’s belief
about the chooser’s valuation. Any information revealed to the chooser does
not change her strategy, as her decision only depends on the comparison of
her own valuation with the proposed price.
Since partners’ willingness to pay is U-shaped in the buy/sell mechanism
described in the last section (this is proven in Proposition 7 in the Appendix)
we assume this to be true for bidding functions in the ﬁrst stage12. If equilib-
rium bidding functions b(v) of the ﬁrst-round auction are U-shaped with a
minimum at some valuation vm, then as illustrated in Figure 1, the loser who
bid b(vP) knows that the chooser’s valuation vC must fulﬁll b(vC) >b(vP).
Further, because of the U-shaped form of the bidding function, there exists
another valuation   vP resulting in the same bid b(vP)=b(  vP). Assuming
that   vP >v P the proposer knows that the chooser’s valuation must be either
above   vP or below vP.
Lemma 2 If the bidding strategies in the negotiation stage are U-shaped,
and the proposer in the negotiation stage submitted a bid   b such that there
is v∗ <v ∗∗ with b(v∗)=b(v∗∗)=  b then the proposer”s updated beliefs are
given by
F








F(v∗)+1−F(v∗∗) if x ∈ [0,v∗]
F(v∗)
F(v∗)+1−F(v∗∗) if x ∈ [v∗,v ∗∗]
F(x)−F(v∗∗)+F(v∗)
F(v∗)+1−F(v∗∗) if x ∈ [v∗∗,1].
If there are no two types with b(v∗)=b(v∗∗) then this distribution is given
by the formula above and v∗∗ = v∗, with b(v∗)=  b.
auction (and hence the rising price) at any time. The partner who stops the auction
becomes proposer and receives a payment equal to the price at which the auction was
stopped.
12As will become clear later on, this is still valid if partners learn more about their







Lemma 3 If bidding functions at the negotiation stage are U-shaped, there
is a unique optimal price for the proposer in the pricing stage.
3.2 The negotiation stage
In this subsection we focus on the bidding functions that will be optimal
for the partners given the continuation pricing game described before. We
ﬁrst note that the overall utility of a partner in the dissolution game can
be decomposed in the expected payoﬀ from being either chooser or proposer
in the pricing game, plus the payments she expects to receive/ pay in the
auction.
To determine their optimal bids, partners will take into account their
willingness to pay for becoming chooser rather than proposer. To illustrate
this point assume ﬁrst that there is an equilibrium with no information rev-
elation in the negotiation phase. If UC (v) denotes the interim utility of a
partner with valuation v who is chooser, and UP (v) the interim utility as
proposer, the diﬀerence in utilities, UC (v) − UP (v), is a U-shaped positive
function (with a minimum at vmed). This can be seen from Figure 2 for the
uniform distribution, and is shown to hold for any cdf in Proposition 7 in
the Appendix. The intuition for this result is that choosers are beneﬁting
from the fact that the proposer has uncertainty about whether she will sell
or buy. Because of this uncertainty prices are set close to vmed, which favors
choosing partners with "more extreme" valuations. In addition, such a part-
ner cannot take much advantage of her "extreme" valuation if she proposes










Figure 2: UC (v) − UP (v) for uniform distribution.
since she does not want to set a price close to vmed, which would result in
unproﬁtable trade with high probability. Since these extreme partners have
more to gain from being choosers they should deviate at the bidding game
to make more likely the event of choosing. This contradicts that optimal
bidding functions are ﬂat. Further, it stresses the relationship between the
optimal bidding functions and the willingness to pay. The main result of this
paper (Theorem 5 below) shows that this happens in equilibrium. It turns
out that equilibrium bidding functions b(v) of the ﬁrst-round auction are
U-shaped with a minimum at the median valuation vmed.
Theorem 4 The following strategies constitute an equilibrium of the disso-
lution game:



















−1(1 − F (v)).
- In the second stage, the proposer sets a price equal to her valuation, i.e.
p = vP.
9Figure 3: The bidding function bB.
Corollary 5 The equilibrium above is ex-post eﬃcient.
The equilibrium bidding functions are strictly decreasing for valuations
below the median vmed and strictly increasing for v>v med. In addition we
have that b(v)=b(s(v)), i.e. for any v we have that the mass of valuations
that submit a higher bid is equally distributed on valuations smaller than v
and valuations that are larger than v.
Example 6 Assume that valuations are distributed according to F (v)=v2,






























2 if 1 √
2 ≤ v ≤ 1.
Theorem 5 provides a rationale for the broad use of buy/sell clauses. To
further understand why the dissolution game is ex-post eﬃcient, we look
at the particular shape of the bidding functions. Its U-shaped form is a
requirement for eﬃciency since we need that for any losing bidders valuation
vP some partners with valuations smaller than vP as well as some partners
with valuations larger than vP bid above b(vP). T h eU - s h a p e df o r mi sa l s oa
natural consequence of the fact that bidding functions reﬂect the willingness
10to pay for becoming chooser rather than proposer. The proposer will never
proﬁt from the oﬀer she makes in the second-round (since she oﬀers a price
that equals her valuation) but solely from the money she receives in the
auction, whereas the proposer’s payoﬀ in the second-round is higher if she
has a more extreme valuation (for the reasons given above). To understand
why partners with valuations v and s(v) bid the same amount13 we investigate
the eﬀects of a small (marginal) change in their bids. If this has the same
(marginal) eﬀect on their expected utilities in the pricing game, partners
with valuations v and s(v) have the same (local) incentives to bid the same
amount b(v). To see that these incentives are indeed equal consider a partner
with valuation v<v med who increases her bid marginally to b(v − dv).A sa
result of this increase she becomes chooser rather than proposer with respect
to the marginal types v and s(v). To calculate the diﬀerence in expected
u t i l i t yf r o mb e i n gc h o o s e rr a t h e rt h a np r o p o s e rw ej u s th a v et ol o o ka tt h e
change in utility that results from trade with the marginal types v and s(v),
as the proposed prices do not change if the bid is increased14.A sp r o p o s e rs h e
will set a price of v. She will hence buy from another partner with valuation
v getting v
2 with "probability" f (v);in addition she will sell to a valuation
s(v) partner, giving her v
2 which also happens15 with "probability" f (v).T h e
overall decrease in her utility from not being proposer (with respect to the
marginal types) is vf (v). On the other hand, as chooser from a partner with
valuation v (who proposes a price of v) she gets v− v
2 = v
2, and from a partner
with valuation s(v) (who oﬀers a price of s(v) a n dt ow h o ms h es e l l s ) she gets
s(v)
2 . Since both events happen with probability f (v), the overall increase in
her utility from being chooser equals
v+s(v)
2 f (v). Deducting
v+s(v)
2 f (v) from
vf(v) gives
s(v)−v
2 f (v). This amount must equal the diﬀerence in expected
utility from being chooser rather than proposer for a partner with valuation
s(v) (who bids as if she were a type v − dv or equivalently type s(v − dv)).
A similar argument to the one we used above gives that as proposer she
expects to get s(v)f (v). If she were chooser instead, she would buy from
a valuation v partner and pay v
2 yielding s(v) − v
2, and sell to a valuation
s(v) partner giving her a utility of
s(v)
2 . Hence the overall expected utility
13This is determined by the willingness-to-pay which is now given by the transfers they
will make/receive in the negotiations and by the expected utility they will accrue from the
pricing stage.
14This is diﬀerent if the bid is decreased. In that case the considered partner will not
propose a price that equals her valuation. The calculations in that case are a bit more
involved and require an Envelope-Theorem argument. See the proof of Theorem 5 (in the
Appendix) for details.
15Note that a decrease in v does increase s(v) hence the "probability" that the partner
faces a valuation s(v) partner is given by - d
dvF (s(v)) =- d
dv (1 − F (v)) = f (v).







This shows that the diﬀerence in expected utility from being chooser rather
than proposer (with respect to the marginal valuations v and s(v))o fa
partner with valuation s(v) is
s(v)−v
2 f (v), i.e. the same as for a valuation v
partner. Putting all this together, we know that in an eﬃcient equilibrium
this change in expected utility has to equal the change in transfers in the
ﬁrst-round auction. The latter includes the direct eﬀect of an increase in b(v)
which increases payments in the case of loosing the auction, resulting in a
change of utility given by 2F (v) d
dvb(v).I ta l s oi n c l u d e st h ee ﬀ e c to fac h a n g e
in winning probabilities. The diﬀerence in payments between proposer and
chooser is 2b(v) (since one receives b i n s t e a do fp a y i n gi t ) ,a n dt h i sc h a n g e
happens with probability 2f (v). Therefore the total (marginal) loss in the
auction from increasing the bid adds up to 2F (v) d
dvb(v)+4 b(v)f (v). In
equilibrium, the cost and revenues from deviating must cancel out which








The bidding function b(v) in Theorem 5 solves this diﬀerential equation.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We analyzed the predominant dissolution mechanism for partnerships, the
so called buy/sell or cake-cutting mechanism. Due to its asymmetric rules,
the theoretical literature considers this procedure inferior (i.e. less eﬃcient)
compared to other more symmetric mechanisms, like e.g. a simultaneous
auction. We provide a rational for the use of the buy/sell clauses if partners
negotiate the diﬀerent roles (i.e. who becomes proposer and chooser). Such
negotiations take place in practice and might lead to an eﬃcient dissolution
of the partnership. An important role is played by the information that is re-
vealed during the negotiations since this is incorporated in the proposed price
which, in contrast to the buy/sell clauses with exogenously ﬁxed proposer,
always enforces eﬃcient trade.
It is important to note that this result relies (like most eﬃciency results in
the literature on auctions) on the fact that partners are ex-ante symmetric16.
If valuations are distributed according to diﬀerent distribution functions we
cannot achieve eﬃciency with the analyzed procedure. In this case a com-
parison with the simultaneous auction would be interesting, which is not
16Even though we need that both partners valuations are identically distributed we do
no need this distribution to be symmetric.
12eﬃcient either. It is not clear to us which mechanism performs better. The
asymmetric case is much harder to analyze, since no closed form solutions for
bidding functions exist, and the proposer will not set prices that equal her
valuation. Another interesting extension is the introduction of common value
components. In such a model eﬃciency might not be possible in general (see
Fieseler et al. [2000] or Kittsteiner [2003]) and it is not clear a priory how
buy/sell clauses with negotiations will perform.
135 Appendix
Proposition 7 The chooser has an interim utility strictly greater than that
of the proposer. Further, the diﬀerence in expected utility between being
chooser or proposer is U-shaped and it has a minimum at vmed.
Proof.
The expected utility of partner i if she is the proposer equals
U
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if p∗(0) <v i ≤ p∗(1)
vi − 1
2Evj(p∗(vj)) if p∗(1) ≤ vi.
The interim diﬀerence between the expected utilities (UC(vi) − UP(vi))
becomes






































We must hence distinguish three cases:
141. If vi ≤ p∗(0) then it is straightforward to see that UC(vi) − UP(vi) is
strictly decreasing in vi.




which is negative for vi ≤ vmed and positive otherwise.
3. If p(1) ≤ v ≤ 1 then
∂(UC(v)−UP(v))
∂v =1− F(p(z)) ≥ 0.
Hence the diﬀerence in expected utility is U-shaped and it has a minimum
at v = vmed.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Assume that the winner of the negotiation bidded according to a U-shaped
function b(v). Assume that a bidder who submitted a bid of   b (in the range
of b(v)) loses the auction. Assume further that we have b(v∗)=b(v∗∗)=  b
with v∗ <v ∗∗ ( i fs u c hav∗∗ does not exist the following proof will also hold
for v∗∗ = v∗). The distribution of the winner’s type vC conditional on having
submitted a bid higher than   b is given by
F








F(v∗)+1−F(v∗∗) if x ∈ [0,v∗]
F(v∗)
F(v∗)+1−F(v∗∗) if x ∈ [v∗,v∗∗]
F(x)−F(v∗∗)+F(v∗)
F(v∗)+1−F(v∗∗) if x ∈ [v∗∗,1].










It is then easy to verify that F C (x) also satisﬁes the standard hazard rate
conditions (1) for x ∈ [0,v∗] ∪ [v∗∗,1]. Assume that vP ≤ v∗. The proposer’s
















Using the abbreviation Up(p)= d
dpU (p) we obtain for p/ ∈ [v∗,v∗∗]
Up(p)=( vP − p)f







vp − p −




















This shows that there is at most one optimum of UP in [0,v∗] and also at
most one optimum in [v∗∗,1].
To show uniqueness and existence of the global maximum it is necessary to
compare the candidates (if they exist) of optima in the intervals (0,v∗) and
(v∗∗,1) (given by the ﬁrst order condition above) and at the boundaries v∗
and v∗∗. This tedious mechanical exercise makes use of concavity properties
of the utility and is omitted.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Consider a bidder with valuation v who bids b(  v) and assume that the other
bidder bids according to (2). Let us assume v ≤ vmed.T h ec a s ev>v med can
be shown similarly and it is hence omitted. We denote the interim utility (of
the dissolution game) of the considered bidder by U (v,  v). By imitating a
b i d d e ro ft y p e  v she will be a chooser in the pricing stage if the other agent’s
valuation is within the interval [  v,s(  v)] and a proposer otherwise. U (v,  v)
can be decomposed in the expected payoﬀ from being chooser (denoted by
UC (v,  v)) and proposer (denoted by UP (v,  v)) in the pricing stage, and the
payments she expects to receive/ pay in the auction. Her expected utility is
then
U (v,  v)=U
P (v,  v)+U
C (v,  v) −
  s(￿ v)
￿ v
b(x)f (x)dx +2 F (  v)b(  v). (3)
Diﬀerentiating the overall expected utility of the deviating bidder with re-
spect to its second argument we have
U2(v,  v)=U
P
2 (v,  v)+U
C
2 (v,  v) − b(s(  v))f(s(  v))
ds(  v)
dˆ v





2 (v,  v)+U
C




where the second equality follows from the symmetry of the bidding function




For b(·) to be an equilibrium strategy, it must be optimal for type v to
bid b(v), which implies the following necessary condition
U2(v,ˆ v) |ˆ v=v=0for all v ∈ [0,v
med]. (4)
16We must then show that max￿ v U (v,  v)=U (v,v). Note that we only need
to show this for   v ≤ vmed by the symmetry of b(·). Since the probability
of winning, the payments and the information revealed is exactly the same
when bidding b(ˆ v) and b(s(ˆ v)), a deviation to a bid b(  v) with   v>v med is
equivalent to deviate to a bid b(s(˜ v)) for some ˜ v ≤ vmed.
In order to derive U2(v,ˆ v) we ﬁrst compute UP
2 (v,ˆ v). A losing bidder who
bids b(  v) correctly infers that the other partner valuation is either smaller
than ˜ v or larger than s(˜ v). She uses this information to update her beliefs,

























2F(￿ v) if x ∈ [0,  v]
F(￿ v)
2F(￿ v) if x ∈ [  v,s(  v)]
F(x)−F(s(￿ v))+F(￿ v)
2F(￿ v) if x ∈ [s(  v),1].











2F(￿ v) + 1
2 if p ≤   v,





2F(￿ v) + 1
2 if p ≥ s(  v),
It is easy to see from the expression above that the optimal price she will
set in the pricing stage depends upon ˜ v. Two cases have to be distinguished






2F(￿ v) + 1





2F(￿ v) + 1
2 < 0 for p ≥ s(  v).
Hence, setting a price in the interval [  v,s(  v)] is optimal, resulting in a utility
as proposer of
U








opt (1 − F (s(  v))) = vF (  v).





2 (v,  v)=vf (v).
Consider now that vmed ≥   v ≥ v. In this case we have
(v − p)
f (p)
2F (  v)
−
F (p) − 1+2 F (  v)




< 0 and (v −   v)
f (  v)
2F (  v)
−
F (  v)





17Hence, the optimal price is popt ≤   v. Consequently, the utility that the
proposer accrues equals
U










































+ F (  v)=0 . (5)





2 (v,  v) = lim
￿ v v
 





















optf (  v)
= vf (v).
The analysis above ensures that for all ˆ v ≤ vmed we obtain UP
2 (v,ˆ v) |ˆ v=v=
vf(v).
We now compute UC
2 (v,ˆ v). As the proposer always sets a price that
equals her valuation, the expected utility as chooser will be
U
C (v,  v)=







  s(￿ v)
v
x
2f (x)dx if   v ≤ v
  s(￿ v)
￿ v
x
2f (x)dx if   v ≥ v.
Diﬀerentiating the chooser’s utility with respect to ˜ v yields
U
C














f(  v) if   v ≥ v,
Evaluating UC















f (v)+2 F (v)
d
dv
b(v)+4 b(v)f (v)=0 .
17To make sure that popt is uniquely deﬁned (given v and ￿ v) we need the hazard rate
condition to hold. For the complete argument see McAfee [1992].
18For (4) to hold at v =0we need that b(0) = 1
8. Thus a diﬀerentiable








f (v)+2 F (v)
d
dv
b(v)+4 b(v)f (v)=0for v ≤ v
med.











and then integrated to obtain (2).
We next show that bidding b(v) indeed does not result in a lower payoﬀ (for
a bidder with valuation v) than bidding b(  v) with   v ≤ vmed. Observe ﬁrst
that for   v ≤ v we have that
U2(v,  v)=−
s(  v) −   v
2
f (  v)+2 F (  v)
d
dv
b(  v)+4 f (  v)b(  v)
with U2,1(v,  v)=0 , and therefore a bid of b(  v) does not give larger payoﬀs
than a bid of b(v). Assume next that   v ≥ v. To show the optimality of b(v)
in this case, it is suﬃcient to show that U2,1(v,  v) ≥ 0 for all v ≤   v ≤ vmed
(see McAfee [1992]). Using the abbreviation pv := ∂




= pvf (  v).
From (5) we obtain that
pv = −
f (popt)




f (popt)f (  v)
2f (popt) − (v − popt)f  (popt)
=
f (popt)f (  v)
2f (popt) −
F(popt)−F(￿ v)
f(popt) f  (popt)
=











  ≥ 0.
The second equality follows form the optimality of popt (recall (5)) and the
last inequality from the hazard rate conditions (1).
We can hence conclude that the candidate equilibrium bid indeed maximizes
the expected utility in (3).
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